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Enacting the Divine: Feminist Theology 
and the Being of God 
Richard Grigg / Sacred Heart University 
While feminist theologians have advanced radical reformulations of tra- 
ditional symbols of God and have clearly explained the social transforma- 
tion that they want such new symbolism to effect, they have been less 
interested in exploring the equally radical ontologies that their reformu- 
lations imply. Carol Christ has suggested, for example, that "a thealogy of 
the Goddess would be very different from the theology that we have 
known in the west," a difference indicated by "the primacy of symbol in 
thealogy in contrast to the primacy of the explanation in theology."' Femi- 
nists' suspicion of ontological explanation is understandable, inasmuch 
as traditional ontological explorations have sometimes proved inimical to 
the quest for social and political liberation. Sharon Welch holds, for in- 
stance, that the limitation of ontological analysis as carried out in most 
academic theologies is twofold: "Specific historical concerns are brack- 
eted, and the experience of certain groups of people is excluded from 
contributing to or determining that analysis."2 Thus, ontological analysis 
often creates abstractions that distract us from concrete circumstances of 
oppression, and it pretends to a universality that it does not have, since 
in reality it is drawn from the narrow experiences of the powerful. 
But, despite these difficulties with some forms of ontology, there are 
good reasons for exploring the being of God in feminist theology. First, 
the concerns expressed by thinkers such as Welch have more to do with 
ontologies of human being and the world than with attempts to under- 
stand the being of God. Second, if feminist theologians wish to talk about 
' Carol P. Christ, Laughter of Aphrodite: Reflections on a Journey to the Goddess (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1987), p. 123. "Thealogy," from the Greek thea, "Goddess," is a term that 
Carol Christ attributes to Naomi Goldenberg (see p. xvii, n. 1). 
2 Sharon D. Welch, Communities of Resistance and Solidarity: A Feminist Theology of Liberation 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1985), p. 38. 
@ 1994 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/94/7404-0003$01.00 
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God or Goddess at all, then they cannot avoid at least rudimentary onto- 
logical suppositions, any more than neoorthodox theologians could avoid 
philosophy and ontology, however ardently they wished to do so.3 Third, 
critics of feminist theology who are sympathetic with its social and politi- 
cal goals but who have no theological commitments of their own will inev- 
itably ask why God-talk is necessary. What does talk of the divine add to 
the quest for liberation? What does it mean? Any answer to these ques- 
tions will require at least an element of ontological explanation. Fourth, 
and more positively, it is useful to explore the ontology behind feminist 
God-talk because the feminist perspective on the being of God may rep- 
resent a revolutionary way of thinking about the divine that sheds light 
on the future of God-talk in feminist theology and beyond. 
This essay's central claim is that there is an implicit motif in much of 
current feminist theology according to which God is a relation that hu- 
man beings choose to enact. This does not entail reducing the divine in 
Feuerbachian fashion to an unconscious, alienating projection or dismiss- 
ing it as a mere imaginary entity. On the contrary, essential constituent 
elements of the divine may genuinely transcend the human-both "na- 
ture" and the "power of being" are familiar candidates in feminist 
thought-and one actualizes a relation to them consciously and in a way 
that is productive not of alienation but of positive transformation. But 
neither is God conceived in this current of feminist theology as an inde- 
pendent reality. Human beings do not simply enact a relation to the di- 
vine; they enact the divine itself, insofar as God is a particular transforma- 
tive relationship between the self and nature, or the self and the power 
of being, or perhaps the self and other selves. At the same time, there is 
no hint here of the autonomous, overconfident self of the modernists. It 
is not a matter of a monadic subject, having fully formed itself ex nihilo, 
subsequently deciding to enact divinity. Rather, the pattern seems much 
closer to Martin Buber's observation that the "I" is formed by the rela- 
tions in which it is engaged: the "I" of the "I-It" relation is a different "I" 
from the "I" of the "I-Thou" relation.4 Human beings choose to enact the 
divine, but they are to a large degree creatures of this relation and not 
3 Recall Paul Tillich's argument in Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chi- 
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). 
4 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1970). Buber's position obviously has influenced a large number of feminist religious think- 
ers. See, e.g., Carol Christ, Laughter of Aphrodite, pp. x, 4, 105; Mary Daly, Beyond God the 
Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1973), p. 39; Christine 
Downing, "Artemis: The Goddess Who Comes from Afar," in Weaving the Visions: New Patterns 
in Feminist Spirituality, ed. Judith Plaskow and Carol Christ (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1989), pp. 123-24; Judith Plaskow, Standing again at Sinai:Judaism from a Feminist Perspective 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 157; Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: 
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just its creators.5 
This perspective represents more than simply an incremental variation 
on previous Western approaches to the ontology of the divine. Indeed, it 
might well be read as a dialectical metamorphosis of traditional theism. 
Briefly put, traditional Western theism understands the divine as a tran- 
scendent Supreme Being. Modernity negates theism by reducing it to a 
projection of human subjectivity. The feminist position negates this nega- 
tion by conceiving of the divine as neither an independent supernatural 
being nor a product of misplaced human imagination, but as a way of 
existence, a particular kind of relation that human beings can enact be- 
tween themselves and others and between themselves and nonhuman 
beings and forces. 
Feminist theology is obviously not a monolithic movement. There are 
many types of feminist religious thought, and tensions surely exist be- 
tween different feminist theological camps, tensions indicated by labels 
such as "reformers" and "revolutionaries" or "feminists" and "wom- 
anists." Yet the radical ontological motif of interest here seems to cut 
across some of these divisions: its traces can be found as easily in the 
thought of Rosemary Radford Ruether as in that of Carol Christ. Of 
course, following up these traces will entail more than simply summariz- 
ing the works of various feminist thinkers; my interpretation will of neces- 
sity be a constructive one. I shall lay the groundwork for this constructive 
reading by attempting to work out the logic behind the motif that I want 
to highlight. Then, in the second section of the essay, I shall look to par- 
ticular thinkers and themes to flesh out this abstract logic. This will in- 
volve a consideration of what various feminist thinkers have to say about 
An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 228, 252, 
302 (n. 36); Dorothee Slle, Thinking about God: An Introduction to Theology, trans. John Bow- 
den (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990), p. 185. 
5 To say that human beings choose to "enact" the divine seems to convey the proper sense, 
then. Note that "enact" can mean, first of all, "to legislate," which carries a creative, active 
sense, and that is part of what I want to highlight about the feminist reformulation of the 
divine. But "enact" can also mean "to put on a play," in which case the persons who "act" 
are not acting as autonomous egos but are the vehicles for something else, namely, the 
identities that they are representing on the stage. Similarly, to enact the divine is to actualize 
the self's creative powers at the same time that the self is formed by something beyond 
itself. Buber's interpretation of the I-Thou relationship can be used not only as a key to 
how the self is formed as it enacts the divine but also as a model or analogue for the phe- 
nomenon of enactment itself: just as the relation enacted between I and Thou is not some- 
thing unreal and merely external to I and Thou, so the relation to be discussed here, a 
relation enacted between the self and nature, other selves, and the power of being-itself, is 
something very real and something more than the sum of its constituent elements. Indeed, 
this relation is the divine (in contrast to the more traditional perspective that results from 
Buber's own theological extrapolations from his I-Thou anthropology, according to which 
God is not a relation that human beings enact, but one of the poles in a relation, the Eter- 
nal Thou). 
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the pragmatic bent of feminist theological method, the notion of divine 
immanence, and the centrality of relationship in human existence. In the 
final section of the essay, I shall attempt to situate the feminist enactment 
model of deity in the wider contemporary discussion. 
I 
The logic at issue begins with the familiar observation that traditional 
male theologies are ideological. These theologies invariably employ male 
images to describe God-Father, Lord, King-and such images reflect 
and reinforce patriarchal power. One response to this observation might 
be to embrace an abstract philosophical perspective that promises to take 
us beyond ideological descriptions of the divine. From this perspective 
one supposedly recognizes that God is a transcendent reality that cannot 
be modeled in terms of human attributes and experiences. We cannot 
rely on human gender categories in our attempt to understand God. In- 
stead, we must reach for abstract formulations such as the identification 
of God with being-itself. Or perhaps we should rest content with an apo- 
phatic theology, according to which we can only say what the divine is 
not, never what it is. 
The suggestion here is that a carefully wrought philosophical theology 
can protect us from ideologically motivated notions of God. But a thor- 
oughgoing feminist is bound to ask whether this isn't all a bit naive. Why 
should we assume that the philosophical vantage point from which we 
are trying to root out ideology is not itself ideological? This line of ques- 
tioning uncovers an interesting paradox: a feminist might attempt to re- 
veal masculine imagery for God to be ideological and inadequate by ar- 
guing that God's radical transcendence gives the lie to any description of 
the divine drawn from the realm of human experience. But this very 
notion of divine transcendence might be a peculiarly male creation, an 
expression of the assumption that the hierarchical structure of patriar- 
chal society mirrors the divine-human relationship. 
Thus, the attempt to avoid patriarchal ideology by eschewing all 
gender-specific imagery and insight in favor of philosophical abstractions 
soon breaks down. This is not to say that all descriptions of divinity are 
necessarily ideological, nor even less that all uses of reason are ideologi- 
cally deformed, but only that this particular and familiar philosophical 
avenue turns out to be a dead end. But this is hardly the avenue that a 
committed feminist would choose in any case, for the feminist religious 
thinker typically wants to accomplish more than simply the negative task 
of removing destructive patriarchal elements from our notion of the di- 
vine. She wants, in addition, to find a notion of divinity that valorizes 
women's experiences and that empowers women in their spiritual, social, 
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and political quests. Hence the decision to draw directly and unapologeti- 
cally from women's experience in the attempt to talk about the divine. 
Most feminist theologies will make no effort, then, to be disinterested or 
(naively) objective: they will be self-consciously interested and perspecti- 
val, rooted in women's histories, experiences, and aspirations. 
This methodological decision nonetheless requires justification. For, on 
what grounds do we assume that this self-consciously interested perspec- 
tive will provide an accurate reflection of divinity? Of course, this per- 
spective is probably no more problematic than any other interested per- 
spective. Indeed, it will not be open to the charge of ideology in the way 
that traditional male theology is, for, in patriarchal societies, women's ex- 
periences are not a function of entrenched power. But this does not mean 
that the feminist perspective tells us about the reality of God. Isn't the 
feminist approach a form of wish fulfillment? Why should we assume that 
the reality of God reflects what we wish to be the case or what would be 
beneficial for us? However sound the feminist theological agenda may be 
in terms of the quest for justice, we cannot blithely suppose that what 
ought to be the case about God is in fact the case. Is feminist theology 
condemned, then, to escape the Marxist critique of religion as ideology 
only to fall prey to the Freudian critique of religion as illusion?6 
This challenge sets up the final step in the logic of feminist religious 
thought; it makes clear where the trajectory of feminist theology ulti- 
mately leads. The feminist perspective can be defended against the 
Freudian charge of illusion by arguing that the charge misunderstands 
feminist theology's notion of divinity. The Freudian critique rests on the 
assumption that the religious person believes in a God who is a supernat- 
ural reality independent of the self. Because this belief is a function of 
what the individual wishes to be the case rather than a matter of reason 
and evidence, it must be dismissed as an illusion. After all, what we wish 
to be the case has no necessary connection with what is in fact the case 
about entities that are independent of us. But theology need not conceive 
of God as a reality independent of human projects and sensibilities, but 
can understand God instead as a reality that is actualized through those 
sensibilities and projects. The divine is a relation that human beings de- 
cide to enact. Theology's task, then, is not to gain access to and make 
claims about some objective entity that it naively supposes is "out there," 
but to actualize the divine. This claim follows naturally on the feminist 
inclination to pursue a theology that is, in the fullest sense of the phrase, 
a theology "from below," a theology that is openly a function of women's 
6 See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, ed. and trans. James Strachey (New York: 
Norton, 1961). 
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experiences and goals. In short, what women in their quest for justice 
wish to be the case is, quite appropriately, constitutive of the divine. 
It is important to note at the outset that this conception of the divine 
as a relation enacted by human beings goes well beyond the vision of the 
ultimate found in thinkers such as Heidegger and Tillich. Granted, both 
Heidegger and Tillich envision a nonobjective ultimate, and both tie the 
ultimate to the human subject. For the early Heidegger, one can only talk 
about Sein in relation to Dasein. And, for Tillich, one can only make sense 
of being-itself by reference to human being, through which being-itself is 
manifest as courage, the triumph over the threat of nonbeing. But both 
the relation between Sein and Dasein and that between being-itself and 
human being have an element of structural necessity about them that 
does not characterize the relationship between human beings and the 
sacred suggested by feminist theology. From the feminist perspective that 
we are exploring, human beings choose to enact the divine. 
Again, in Hegel's panentheism it is human thinking that brings the 
Absolute to full self-consciousness. But this is a necessary process, not 
one human beings choose to initiate. While the Absolute requires human 
consciousness as a vehicle through which to realize itself, this process is 
nonetheless largely independent of human freedom, and the Absolute 
must therefore be regarded as self-originating, a causa sui. By contrast, to 
say that human beings can choose to enact the divine is to suggest that 
God is not self-originating, however much God may finally transcend the 
human beings who enact God. 
II 
Having explored the general logic leading to the enactment model of 
deity, we must turn to specific positions staked out by particular feminist 
thinkers, beginning with their commitment to a pragmatic theological 
method. A radically pragmatic theological method, that is, one that begins 
from pragmatic principles, implies one of two things: either the theolo- 
gian has fallen prey to illusion in the Freudian sense, in that she or he 
assumes that what one wishes to be the case about the world, what would 
be useful for human purposes, provides insight into the nature of a self- 
originating deity; or one recognizes that the divine is not self-originating 
but is something that human beings decide to enact. But isn't there a 
third alternative, something between these two extremes? Suppose that 
we conceive of God as self-originating, yet radically immanent. This deity 
would be intimately connected with our own being. Perhaps in this case 
we could argue that our own wishes for justice and our projects on its 
behalf do provide insight into the reality of the divine, but that our proj- 
ects do not enact the divine. This God is sufficiently immanent for us 
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to assume that our quest for justice mirrors her being, but ontologically 
independent at least to the degree that she is not beholden to human 
beings for her existence. 
But how do we know that there is such a God in the first place? How 
do we settle on this notion of deity? If a theology is radically pragmatic, 
if it uses pragmatic principles as its starting point, then it will have to 
make this decision too on pragmatic grounds. But, then we must ask all 
over again on what grounds we can assume that our wishes and projects 
can tell us about the nature of God, unless of course God is acknowledged 
to be not just accessible through those wishes and projects but in some 
sense a function of them. There is an all-important difference, then, be- 
tween a radical theological pragmatism and pragmatic or instrumental 
approaches directed toward the natural world: in the latter case, the exis- 
tence of the reality one seeks to know is not at issue. A pragmatist philoso- 
pher will probably point out that one never knows the world in and of 
itself apart from our projects, but the world is nonetheless a given, and it 
even asserts its independence by resisting some of our projects to shape 
it. There is no such giveness or resistance in the theological realm. As a 
result, we confront the notorious fact that there are almost no characteris- 
tics of the divine on which all investigators are forced to agree. 
It turns out, then, that the proposed third alternative, focused on an 
immanent deity that is nonetheless self-originating, cannot issue consis- 
tently from a theology that begins with pragmatic principles, but only 
from a theology that starts with a notion of God derived from authority, 
or tradition, or faith, or argument, or some other source, and only subse- 
quently brings pragmatic principles to bear. 
Some of the most influential feminist theologies have a pragmatic start- 
ing point. This does not necessarily mean that the thinkers who have 
created these theologies subscribe to a particular school of philosophical 
pragmatism. Rather, it is a general methodological tendency that is at 
issue here: these feminist thinkers self-consciously intend to construct im- 
ages of the divine that will empower women, and this is their primary 
criterion, their starting point, for determining what they take to be the 
truth about deity. Of course, we can uncover some connections between 
various feminist theologies and particular schools of philosophical prag- 
matism. Some feminist theologians do after all make explicit use of prag- 
matist thinkers. Rebecca Chopp, for instance, draws on the work of 
Charles Peirce.7 And John Dewey's famous pragmatist dictum that "the 
hypothesis that works is the true one" certainly applies to the feminist 
7 See Rebecca S. Chopp, The Power to Speak: Feminism, Language, God (New York: Cross- 
road, 1989). 
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methodological bent that is of interest here.8 Furthermore, both William 
James and Dewey, when they speak about religion, think of their prag- 
matic criterion of truth as a matter not of abstract intellectual usefulness, 
but as one of existential or moral usefulness. Thus, James claims that 
religion produces consequences "useful to life,"' and Dewey links faith 
with the project of unifying the self and striving for our moral ideals.'1 
But the specifics of James's pragmatism are tied up with his "radical em- 
piricism," as the specifics of Dewey's pragmatism are tied up with his 
"empirical naturalism," and it is thus not to be expected that feminist 
theologians will necessarily want to embrace these specifics or those of 
any other school of philosophical pragmatism. 
Ruether's Sexism and God-Talk provides a clear example of a pragmatic 
methodological bent. Images of deity, she explains, "must be transforma- 
tive."" This is consistent with what Ruether terms the "critical principle 
of feminist theology": "Whatever diminishes or denies the full humanity 
of women must be presumed not to reflect the divine." Put positively, 
"What does promote the full humanity of women is of the Holy, it does 
reflect true relation to the divine, it is the true nature of things.""2 
Ruether is certainly not alone here. Mary Daly, in her classic manifesto 
of feminist theological consciousness, Beyond God the Father, suggests a 
"pragmatic yardstick or verification process" for God-language: "In my 
thinking, the specific criterion which implies a mandate to reject certain 
forms of God-talk is expressed in the question: Does this language hinder 
human becoming by reinforcing sex-role socialization? Expressed posi- 
tively.... Does it encourage human becoming toward psychological and 
social fulfillment, toward an androgynous mode of living, toward tran- 
scendence?"''3 
This same pattern, wherein one articulates both a negative and a posi- 
tive form of a fundamental pragmatic principle, is found in Elisabeth 
Schtissler Fiorenza's approach to feminist Christian biblical interpreta- 
tion. She holds that a feminist critical hermeneutics must "reject those 
elements within all biblical traditions and texts that perpetuate, in the 
name of God, violence, alienation, and patriarchal subordination, and 
eradicate women from historical-theological consciousness. At the same 
8 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor/New American Library, 
1950), p. 129. 
9 William James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth (New York: 
Meridian/New American Library, 1974), p. 177. 
'0 See John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1934). 
" Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Bea- 
con, 1983), p. 69. 
12 Ibid., p. 19. 
13 Daly, Beyond God the Father (n. 4 above), p. 21. 
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time, such a feminist critical hermeneutics must recover all those ele- 
ments within biblical texts and traditions that articulate the liberating ex- 
periences and visions of the people of God."'4 The pragmatic starting 
point is clear: "The revelatory canon for theological evaluation of biblical 
androcentric traditions and their subsequent interpretations cannot be 
derived from the Bible itself but can only be formulated in and through 
women's struggle for liberation from all patriarchal oppression."'15 
We find a similar pragmatic hermeneutical principle in Judith 
Plaskow's critical reinterpretation of Judaism. The authority that 
grounds her critique is "the experience of particular communities strug- 
gling for religious transformation."'6 And the particular community to 
which she is beholden is the Jewish feminist community and its quest for 
justice for women. To turn to the struggle for transformation as the 
source of authority and the criterion for one's theolgical project is, of 
course, to embrace a pragmatic theological method. 
Carol Christ provides yet another example of a pragmatic approach. 
As Sallie McFague observes, "Christ's pragmatic position is illustrated by 
her lack of concern whether the Goddess is entirely immanent or also 
transcendent; what matters is the power for self-definition that it gives to 
women, its focus as a unifying symbol of female power."" It is worth not- 
ing how McFague's formulation hints at the connection between a thor- 
oughgoing pragmatism and one's position on the ontological status of 
the divine. 
If a pragmatic methodological bent is central to the whole notion of 
enacting the divine, so too is the concept of divine immanence. For, while 
not every theology that emphasizes divine immanence implies that we 
enact the divine, a perspective according to which we enact the divine 
will have to embrace divine immanence. One might claim that God is 
both immanent and transcendent and understand that claim in such a 
way that God holds on to most of the attributes of the traditional Su- 
preme Being, for example, the ability to miraculously intervene in history 
and to resurrect human beings after death. This would be a God, in other 
words, who has a transcendent pole that owes much to traditional West- 
ern descriptions of deity, but who can also be said to embrace the finite 
in God's own being. Now in a theology according to which we enact God, 
one might also speak in terms of both immanence and transcendence. 
There will necessarily be an emphasis on immanence in such a theology, 
14 Elisabeth Schuissler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of 
Christian Origins (New York: Crossroad, 1983), pp. 32-33. 
15 Ibid., p. 32. 
16 Plaskow (n. 4 above), p. 20. 
17 Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1982), p. 158. 
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insofar as God arises out of our own experiences, goals, and actions. But 
there can be a transcendent dimension as well, in at least two ways. First, 
as we shall see later on, the individual elements that human beings bring 
together in enacting the divine may transcend the human. Second, the 
relation that is enacted will itself surely surpass the individuals who effect 
it. Indeed, as was suggested above by reference to Buber's philosophy of 
the "I," the human self may end up, in some sense, being formed by the 
relations that it enacts. 
But despite these very real elements of transcendence, some of the tra- 
ditional supernatural attributes of divinity will most likely disappear in 
any enactment theology. A God who is beholden to us for her being and 
thus rooted in the finite, natural world cannot be conceived as a super- 
natural individual who can step in from beyond the finite world and vio- 
late its constitutive principles. For instance, we cannot expect, from the 
vantage point of this theology, to be resurrected from the dead. 
A move away from traditional Western images of transcendence and 
toward a sense of the divine as immanent is a central dynamic in contem- 
porary feminist theology, as Plaskow and Carol Christ make clear in their 
editorial remarks in Weaving the Visions.'8 Feminist theologians are critical 
of traditional male theologies that so often end up, in Chopp's words, 
"reifying God."'9 Indeed, one of the most powerful reasons feminists 
have for focusing on the image of the Goddess rather than on a male 
image to symbolize the divine is of course that the Goddess suggests 
something closer to women themselves, something radically immanent.20 
In Beyond God the Father, Daly provides a succinct formulation of the 
principle of immanence in feminist theology: "In hearing and naming 
ourselves out of the depths, women are naming toward God."21 Later on, 
she develops this emphasis on immanence and speaks of "the Goddess 
within" and points to "a sense of power, not of the 'wholly other,' but of 
the Self's be-ing."22 
Another example of feminist theology's commitment to immanence is 
found in Carol Christ's description of women's religious experience: 
"'Awakening' is perhaps a more appropriate term than 'conversion' for 
describing women's mystical experience, because 'awakening' suggests 
the self needs only to notice what is already there. Awakening implies 
1s Plaskow and Christ, eds. (n. 4 above), p. 93. 
19 Chopp (n. 7 above), p. 83. Chopp is speaking of Karl Barth. Compare Mary Daly, 
Beyond God the Father, p. 33. 
20 See Nelle Morton, "The Goddess as Metaphoric Image," in Plaskow and Christ, eds., 
pp. 111-18. 
21 Daly, Beyond God the Father, p. 33. First emphasis is mine. 
22 Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon, 1978), pp. 
111, 49. 
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that the ability to see or to know is within the self, once the sleeping draft 
is refused. Conversion often seems to imply that one has turned from one 
source of authority to another, for example, from materialism to God. It 
seems to be characteristic of women's awakening that the great powers, 
while larger than the self, are within as well as without."23 
All of this implies a rejection of the traditional image of the divine as a 
supernatural individual who can stand outside the finite. In the words of 
Naomi Goldenberg, feminists ought to "radically depart from ... all sys- 
tems of thought that posit transcendent, superhuman deities."24 At the 
same time, there is a type of transcendence that can be combined with 
the emphasis on immanence so essential to feminist theology, at least ac- 
cording to thinkers such as Ruether. Ruether rejects the transcendent, 
imperial God of patriarchal Christianity in favor of "the root human im- 
age of the divine as the Primal Matrix, the great womb within which all 
things, Gods and humans, sky and earth, human and nonhuman beings, 
are generated. ... Here the divine is not 'up there' as abstracted ego, but 
beneath and around us as encompassing source of life and renewal of 
life."25 In this image of what Ruether would have us call "God/ess," the 
divine is clearly immanent, but also all-encompassing, also transcendent 
to some degree.26 The term "Primal Matrix" suggests an embracing 
framework or ground, something beyond us that we are nonetheless a 
part of. 
While none of these examples of the feminist commitment to divine 
immanence demands to be interpreted in terms of the enactment model 
of divinity, each of the examples is fully consistent with the enactment 
model. And we should not overlook the radical implications that these 
thinkers themselves sometimes draw from their commitment to divine 
immanence. Most notable in this regard is the suggestion, clearly articu- 
lated by both Ruether and Christ, that religious persons should abandon 
the notion of life after death." In order to gauge the significance of this 
move, we need to keep in mind the centrality of the hope for deliverance 
from death in traditional religion. The prolific and provocative literary 
critic Harold Bloom, who recently has made a number of well-publicized 
forays into the realm of religious studies, goes so far as to assert that 
"religion, whether it be shamanism or Protestantism, rises from our ap- 
23 Carol P. Christ, Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest (Boston: Bea- 
con, 1980), p. 18. 
24 Naomi R. Goldenberg, "Archetypal Theory and the Separation of Mind and Body: Rea- 
son Enough to Turn to Freud?" in Plaskow and Christ, eds., p. 249. 
25 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk (n. 11 above), pp. 48-49. 
26 Ibid., p. 46. 
27 Ibid., pp. 257-58; Christ, Laughter of Aphrodite (n. I above), pp. 210, 226, and "Rethink- 
ing Theology and Nature," in Plaskow and Christ, eds., pp. 314, 321, 323. 
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prehension of death."28 For Bloom, who sees himself as a nonreductionist 
critic seeking the defining essence of religion, "the category of the 'reli- 
gious' is set against death even as the 'poetic' seeks a triumph over 
time."29 Put as an impish query, "If medicine someday could grant im- 
mortality (virtually, to those who could pay for it), you, of course, still 
would be religious, but what about your neighbor?"30 Though one would 
do well to be on guard against the genetic fallacy here, Bloom's point is 
surely worthy of attention, considering traditional religion's focus on 
death, from the Four Passing Sights that sent Gautama on his quest, to 
the Resurrection of Jesus. 
One might well argue that the rejection of the traditional emphasis on 
life after death by feminist thinkers such as Ruether and Christ does im- 
ply something about the being of the divine. A divinity who does not 
deliver us from death perhaps cannot deliver us. And she cannot because 
she is rooted in nature and the finite. Perhaps one can even construct a 
continuum of positions on life after death and show how each position 
corresponds to a particular notion of the being of God: traditional Chris- 
tian theism puts great emphasis on a literal restoration of the individual 
after death, and it sees God as a supernatural person, wholly indepen- 
dent of the finite, natural world; Whiteheadian process theism often re- 
jects the continued self-conscious existence of the individual after death 
in favor of "objective immortality" in the consequent nature of God, and 
its God is a limited, albeit self-originating, deity rather than an omnipo- 
tent Supreme Being; feminist theologians such as Ruether and Christ 
discourage the interest in life after death altogether, and their deity is 
not a transcendent individual, nor even self-originating, but a reality that 
human beings enact. 
The underlying logic of feminist theology leads to the conclusion that 
human beings enact the divine. And the radical pragmatism embraced 
by many feminist theologians entails an enactment theology. Furthermore, 
the emphasis on immanence so evident in feminist religious thought is 
supportive of the enactment model. There is but one more piece of the 
puzzle to be put in place, then, namely, the centrality of relationship in 
feminist theology. In Weaving the Visions, Plaskow and Christ make clear 
that relationality is constitutive of human being for feminist theologians, 
and they note a connection between the feminist emphasis on rela- 
tionality and that on divine immanence: the authors whom their collec- 
tion anthologizes "agree that the self is essentially relational, inseparable 
28 Harold Bloom, The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 
29 Ibid., p. 36. 
30 Ibid., p. 257. 
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from the limiting and enriching contexts of body, feeling, relationship, 
community, history, and the web of life. The notion of the relational self 
can be correlated with the immanental turn in feminist views of the sa- 
cred: in both cases connection to that which is finite, changing, and lim- 
ited is affirmed.""3 The grace of God "always comes to us in, with, and 
through each other," as Beverly Harrison puts it.32 And if this is taken to 
its logical conclusion, we can say with Carter Heyward that God is the 
"power of relation."33 
In order to illustrate how all of the pieces fit together here, let us read 
Ruether's Sexism and God-Talk in terms of the enactment model of deity. 
First, note Ruether's claim that God/ess is experienced "in and through 
relationships, healing our broken relations with our bodies, with other 
people, with nature."34 It is when we overcome the destructive mind-set 
of man versus woman, rich versus poor, and spirit versus matter-dual- 
isms that separate us from nature and from other human beings-that 
we find ourselves in relation to divinity: "Community with God/ess exists 
precisely in and through this renewed community of creation."35 But 
none of the constituent elements of this relation has, considered by itself, 
the qualities of deity, not even Ruether's version of nature as an under- 
girding power. By itself, this power is only the "cosmic matrix of matter/ 
energy."36 This is hardly the stuff of ultimate concern, that is, of religious 
passion and devotion. The cosmic matrix of matter/energy, while obvi- 
ously the basis of our existence, is at best indifferent to the fulfillment of 
the human project as well as the future of any other species. It is perfectly 
possible, for example, that a huge meteor may someday slam into the 
earth and propel so much dust and debris into the atmosphere that life 
on earth will be obliterated. This would be totally consistent with the so- 
called laws of nature, the principles that obtain within the cosmic matrix. 
And it would make no difference to the cosmic matrix if this calamity 
were to occur just as oppressed peoples were first finding their voices. 
The cosmic matrix of matter/energy is not God/ess, then, but it is a 
crucial element in the being of God/ess. For God/ess appears when one 
relates to the cosmic matrix, and the beings that it undergirds, in a partic- 
ular fashion. When I recognize that I am not all, that I am only a small 
part of the encompassing cosmic matrix, that I am finite and must die, 
31 Plaskow and Christ, eds. (n. 4 above), p. 173. 
32 Beverly Wildung Harrison, "The Power of Anger in the Work of Love: Christian Ethics 
for Women and Other Strangers," in Plaskow and Christ, eds., p. 225. 
33 Carter Heyward, "Sexuality, Love, and Justice," in Plaskow and Christ, eds., p. 299. 
34 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 71. 
35 Ibid., p. 163. 
36 Ibid., p. 257. 
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then I may also recognize that I cannot set myself up in a position of 
dominance over other beings; I may come to accept the limitations of my 
own being and my responsibilities toward other beings, both human and 
nonhuman. And this relation to the cosmic matrix and the beings that it 
grounds enacts the divine. God/ess appears as this salvific relation, as this 
"renewed community of creation." Buber's philosophy of the self comes 
into play here, for while "I" must in some sense decide to engage in this 
relationship, the character of the "I" is determined by the relation itself. 
The relation empowers a new way of being for the "I." 
The difference between the undergirding power of nature considered 
by itself and the larger religious relation of which it is an essential, cata- 
lytic element is nicely, if unintentionally, suggested by the contrast be- 
tween Ruether's two expressions "cosmic matrix of matter/energy" and 
"Primal Matrix." While the former suggests a dispassionate, even techni- 
cal attitude, the latter has a poetic resonance. Again, while the word "ma- 
trix" in "cosmic matrix of matter/energy" is at least quasi-scientific, when 
it is capitalized and juxtaposed with "Primal," it much more readily dis- 
plays its original meaning of "womb" and its etymological connection 
with the word "mother."37 
It is important to note the genuine interplay of transcendence and im- 
manence here. Because God/ess is a relation that we enact, divine being 
is radically immanent. But because there are constituent elements of this 
relation that transcend us-the matrix of nature and all of the beings 
that it contains-and because the relation itself taken as a whole is infi- 
nitely more than our own being and sustains us in a new and more pro- 
ductive way of being even as we enact it, the divine is also transcendent. 
The same reading can be made of Ruether's most recent book, Gaia 
and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing. "To believe in divine be- 
ing," she tells us, means to believe that the qualities of consciousness and 
altruism that we find in the human species "are rooted in and respond 
to the life power from which the universe itself arises."38 But are these 
qualities rooted in that undergirding life power in the way in which an 
Aristotelian effect is rooted in its cause, so that the effect can possess only 
those qualities already found full-blown in the cause? Or is it through the 
relationship between the human species and the underlying life power 
that these qualities first come into being? If we choose the latter option, 
then it appears that the power of life is not itself divine so much as the 
relation that is enacted between human beings and the power of life. 
37 "Matrix" is derived from the Latin matrix, which is related to mater, "mother." Compare 
ibid., p. 49. 
38 Ruether, Gaia and God (n. 4 above), p. 5. 
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Other feminist theologies exhibit a similar pattern. Daly, for instance, 
often appears to equate the divine with the "power of being."39 But just 
what "is" the power of being? At one point Daly explains that "Be-ing is 
the verb that says the dimensions of depth in all verbs, such as intuiting, 
reasoning, loving, imaging, making, acting, as well as the couraging, hop- 
ing, and playing that are always there when one is really living."40 But if 
all verbs are included, as Daly asserts, then "Be-ing" or "power of being" 
must also point to the dimensions of depth in hating, killing, mutilating, 
and so on.41 It seems unlikely, then, that Daly would want to equate the 
Goddess with the power of being in any simple, unqualified fashion. Her 
intention is probably more clearly expressed in her claim that the God- 
dess is "the Self-affirming be-ing of women."42 This suggests that divinity 
is not to be identified with the power of being but, rather, with a particu- 
lar way in which women can tap into the power of being in themselves 
and make it productive of a new feminist consciousness and mode of exis- 
tence. Women enact divinity in themselves through a particular relation 
to the power of being. 
Similarly, Carol Christ focuses on nature in her own "journey to the 
Goddess," but not nature by itself. She explains that "Goddess symbolism 
unites two themes in my work: she is woman and she is nature."43 That 
is, Goddess is not to be equated with nature, but understood as a special 
kind of relation that can obtain between women and nature. The God- 
dess is born when women come to understand their rootedness in nature 
and finitude and claim the power that such rootedness confers. This is, 
says Christ, "a deeply relational power, which comes from understanding 
the connection of my power of being to that of all other life."44 
The telos of all of these radically relational theologies, namely, the en- 
actment model of deity, is succinctly expressed in Dorothee Sille's obser- 
vation that "today, the dispute over whether God can be thought of be- 
yond us as resting in himself and unrelated, or whether God is the 
relationship itself and can be thought of only as relationship, seems to me 
to be one of the most important arguments between male-patriarchal and 
feminist theology."45 
39 See, e.g., Daly, Beyond God the Father (n. 4 above), p. 28. 
40 Daly, Gyn/Ecology (n. 22 above), pp. 23-24. 
41 There might be ways to avoid this, of course. For example, one might interpret evil in 
Augustinian fashion, i.e., as a privation, so that it would have no depth dimension and 
would not be a function of the power of being. 
42 Daly, Gyn/Ecology, p. 111. 
43 Christ, Laughter of Aphrodite (n. I above), p. xi. 
44 Ibid., p. 105. 
45 Solle, Thinking about God (n. 4 above), p. 181. 
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III 
The enactment model of deity suggested by some feminist theologians 
can be read as a dialectical reconfiguration of traditional Western theism. 
Traditional theism thinks of God as an independent supernatural being 
who has created the universe. Modernity negates this theism by declaring 
the God of theism to be a mere fiction, a projection based on infantile 
psychological needs or on the economic substructure of a particular soci- 
ety. That current of feminist theology according to which we enact God 
negates the modern negation of theism by reconceiving God as neither a 
supernatural individual nor a mere fiction, but a transformative relation 
that human beings choose to enact. This God is both radically immanent 
and genuinely transcendent. 
Perhaps the Heideggerian and Tillichian approaches to the ultimate 
can also be described as dialectical reconfigurations of theism. But the 
feminist approach can be distinguished from them. Heidegger's ontology 
focuses on the notion of the "ontological difference": Being is not to be 
confused with beings. Being is no-thing. When Heidegger's thought is 
moved into a theological register, as it is in the work of Tillich, one might 
talk about the "theological difference": God is not to be confused with 
beings. God is not a being, but being-itself, the ground and abyss of being. 
Where the feminist enactment model of deity is concerned, we should 
perhaps speak of the "thealogical difference": God (or Goddess) is not a 
being, but neither is God to be identified with being-itself. Rather, God is 
a particular kind of relation between human beings and being-itself, na- 
ture, and other beings. 
It may be tempting to situate this feminist approach to the being of 
God by labeling it "postmodern." After all, it is a negation of modernity's 
negation of theism. But the term "postmodern" is, at best, uninformative 
and, at worst, misleading. First, the label "postmodern theology" is 
annoyingly ambiguous, in that it is used to describe everything from fi- 
deistic theologies that reject the modern demand for argument and justi- 
fication-for example, the work of D. Z. Phillips and Alvin Plantinga- 
to theologies informed by contemporary poststructuralist theory-the 
work of Mark C. Taylor, Edith Wyschogrod, and Charles Winquist, for in- 
stance. 
Second, a recurring theme in postmodern theory, as the term is ordi- 
narily used outside theology, is the disappearance of the human subject 
conceived as a unified personal center. Yet, some of the most influential 
feminist theologians apparently have no interest in abandoning the cen- 
tered self. In Daly's vision of woman, for instance, centeredness is crucial: 
"Unlike the suspended, crucified, self-sacrificing victim, she stands stably 
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on the earth, Self-assuring and Self-centering."46 Daly celebrates "Self- 
Centering Spinsters" who move about the axis of their own be-ing.47 And 
Ruether calls us "to affirm the integrity of our personal center of being, 
in mutuality with the personal centers of all other beings across species 
and, at the same time, accept the transience of these personal selves."48 
One of the manifestations of the oppression of women is that women 
"scarcely have been allowed individuated personhood at all."49 Abandon- 
ment of the notion of personal centeredness hardly seems the effective 
course of action for a feminist, then. 
Third, a characteristic sensibility of postmodernism is summed up in 
Jean-Frangois Lyotard's oft-quoted statement that the postmodern is "in- 
credulous towards metanarratives."50 But feminist theology appears com- 
mitted to something approaching a universal emancipatory narrative. To 
be sure, feminist theologians are becoming ever more sensitive to the 
pluralism within their own ranks and are quick to attack any "false uni- 
versalism."51 But consider Daly's Gyn/Ecology. Daly clearly wants to be able 
to make a cross-cultural critique; she feels confident that she can and 
must condemn Indian suttee, Chinese foot binding, African genital muti- 
lation, European witch burnings, and American gynecology. It seems un- 
likely that such cross-cultural moral indictment is possible if one aban- 
dons metanarratives altogether.52 
The feminist notion of God as a relation that human beings enact, then, 
must be deemed a distinctive contribution to the contemporary discus- 
sion of deity: it stands apart from the Heideggerian ontological differ- 
ence, the Tillichian theological difference, and cannot easily be fit into 
the category of the postmodern. While feminist religious thinkers have 
46 Daly, Gyn/Ecology, p. 388. 
47 Ibid., p. 391. 
48 Ruether, Gaia and God (n. 4 above), p. 251. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 
xxiv. 
51 Plaskow and Christ, eds. (n. 4 above), p. 5. Compare Welch (n. 2 above), chap. 5. 
52 Compare Sabina Lovibond, "Feminism and Postmodernism," in New Left Review 178 
(November-December 1989), pp. 5-28. Yet another potential conflict between postmodern- 
ism and at least some forms of feminist theology arises from the postmodernists' rejection 
of ordinary notions of reference and the desire of most feminist theologians to have their 
God-talk function referentially. See, e.g., Sheila Greeve Davaney, "Problems with Feminist 
Theory: Historicity and the Search for Sure Foundations," in Embodied Love: Sensuality and 
Relationship as Feminist Values, ed. Paula M. Cooey, Sharon A. Farmer, and Mary Ellen Ross 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 79-95. And see Carol Christ's reply, "Embodied 
Thinking: Reflections on Feminist Theological Method," in Journal of Feminist Studies in Reli- 
gion 5 (Spring 1989): 7-15. Note that God-talk understood in terms of the enactment model 
of deity involves few of the referential claims familiar in traditional theologies yet does point 
to something other than a purely imaginative construct. 
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been concerned first and foremost with fashioning a conception of God 
that empowers women in their various liberatory struggles, there are also 
more purely conceptual strengths to be found in their descriptions of 
the divine. Theologians, feminist and otherwise, would do well to begin 
plumbing these strengths. 
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